



There was a time when almost all Western geography could be termed environ-
mental history. In the late nineteenth century, physical geographers explained land-
scapes by describing how they had evolved. Likewise, human geographers saw
society as shaped by the directing hands of the environment. By the 1960s this had
very much changed. Process studies shortened the temporal framework in geo-
graphical explanation and cut the cord between nature and society. Now, physical
and human landscapes were seen as responding to short-term fluctuations around
a long-term steady state. Between the homeostatic systems of the geomorphologist
and the isotropic surfaces of the economic geographer, there seemed to be no con-
gress. For a number of reasons, environmental history now enjoys a renewed sig-
nificance within human geography. I want to explore four sets of reasons why this
is so. First, I will look at the continuing importance of an ecological tradition in
geography that was always more than mere environmental determinism. In the
second place, I will explore how geographical reasoning has continued to be of inter-
est in what we might term big-picture histories. Thirdly, I want to consider how
environmental history was treated within Marxist geography. Finally, I intend to
consider how the New Cultural Geography has treated the subject. I will conclude
by examining some studies that draw upon the best from these four approaches.
Ecological Reasoning in Geography
Environmental determinism was always a contested project within geography. There
were those, such as Herbert John Fleure (1877–1969), who were worried by the
biological determinism, even racism, of much contemporary geography. In Fleure’s
(1962) geography, social organization was a vital variable as was the interaction
between peoples as they moved through and shared or contested the use of differ-
ent regions. Population mixing, resource appraisals, and attention to the ways
people got access to environmental resources complicate any simple determinism.
The history of how societies change is, then, in part the history of how they have
changed their ecological context. Ecological reasoning focuses on how the flows of
natural matter and energy are garnered by different groups. Human life and eco-
nomic development are impossible without this material basis. Without shelter,
food, and tools, there is no society; and without nature there was no shelter, food,
or tools. There are two aspects of Fleure’s work that are still important: first, the
emphasis upon racial impurity and, secondly, the emphasis upon the organization
of work as a culturally variable and crucial factor in explaining how the environ-
ment is evaluated and used at various times and in particular places.
Impurity is significant because it makes it more difficult to use history for xeno-
phobic purposes. Conservative thinkers such as Halford Mackinder (1861–1947)
saw clear correlations between environment, race, and language and insisted that
this explained and justified the division of the earth’s surface into nations and
empires. For Fleure any “simple linkage of race and language with the social group
can, at most, have belonged only to very early times. Admixture came soon enough”
(Peake & Fleure 1927: 121). It is striking to consider how far national histories see
the past in terms of invasion, displacement and conquest. What if we see the past,
instead, as characterized by miscegenation and by ongoing cultural and technolog-
ical conversations between groups? Intermarriage has proved more fruitful for
economies than has isolation: “[c]ulture contacts, except when involving complete
destruction on one side or the other, have not only provided mutual enrichment by
exchange, but have also stimulated fresh developments” (Peake & Fleure 1936: iii).
Diffusion is about interaction not contamination. Fleure could never have agreed
with Mackinder (1931: 326) that the English people were the inheritors of:
The English blood, one fluid, the same down through the centuries, on loan for the moment
in the forty million bodies of the present generation. John Bull in his insularity is the exem-
plar of the myriad separate bloods and saps, each the fluid essence of a local variety or species
of animal or plant.
Fleure (1951: 1), instead, maintained that: “[a]n outstanding feature of the story of
man in Britain is that, in the course of the historic centuries, a considerable measure
of unity has been achieved without a great deal of forcible repression of diversity.
Unity in diversity . . . is a feature of Britain.” The same was true of Europe and this
made the pretensions of the sovereign nation-state dangerous. Writing to caution
against the linguistic nationalism taken as the natural basis for political organiza-
tion by the peacemakers planning Europe after the First World War, Fleure insisted
that economic relations under industrialism must establish connections that tran-
scend the localism of the agricultural societies that sustained earlier coherent
nations. People were implicated in solidarities at multiple scales but Europe did not
seem ready to think about this: “[t]he disastrous muddles made by the British Gov-
ernments in Ireland have shown how little the idea of unity-in-diversity has been
thought out by politicians, and we have to realise that in Europe we can have only
unity-in-diversity” (Fleure 1921: 13).
Work is significant because it turns our attention to the way social groups set
goals in seeking to secure a decent living from their environment. A common crit-
icism of environmental determinism was that it treated society like a mobile plant.
Once set in a particular place, it was the character of the local resources that 
determined if it would flourish. Work, however, is not like that. Work involves 
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communication and is a cultural achievement. There are no Robinson Crusoes in
human history. Furthermore, collective effort is almost always required for people
to keep body and soul together. Land allocation is a social question, private prop-
erty a cooperative achievement. The peasant agriculture of China, thought Fleure,
required ways of sustaining families in their attempts to pass their enhancement of
the soil down to their children. Things were very different for the commercial society
of ancient Greece:
Whereas the Chinese agricultural system contrived to maintain the organization of society
with the family emphasized as the most important unit around which almost everything was
gathered, in the Greek lands with their specialization of crafts and their trade there was a
tendency to make neighbourhood take the place of kinship to some extent in social organi-
zation. Thence there grew systems of law regulating intercourse between unrelated people
. . . (Fleure 1921: 179)
Out of ways of making a living, then, a society develops its legal, philosophical and
cosmological systems. The nomad, the peasant, and the merchant not only repre-
sent different ways that people can use their environment, where they dominate 
particular societies, they produce different systems of social organization and only
through such institutions can society appropriate natural resources.
Another prominent critic of environmental determinism was Carl Ortwin Sauer
(1889–1975). He rejected the notion that nature was the active, society the passive
partner in ecology. Rather he emphasized the extent to which landscapes expressed
the personality of a culture. He also paid close attention to people as geomorphic
and biotic agents. In one of his last seminars, he told students that: “there are the
simple and sturdy souls who identify vegetation with climate. And there are the
people like myself who wonder every time there is something peculiar about a veg-
etation whether somebody didn’t set fire to it” (Parsons 1987: 157). Landscapes,
then, were cultural artifacts of very long gestation. This meant that Sauer was crit-
ical also of the process studies that narrowed geography’s historical sweep. He saw
this as produced by the euphoria of economic triumphalism when the United States
stood lord of all the nature it surveyed, a “brief moment of fulfilment and ease”
(Sauer 1941: 2). At that moment it seemed that nature was bent immediately and
irrevocably to the short-term dictates of the economy. In a letter of 1948, Sauer
expressed the belief that this hubris would soon receive its environmental check:
“[i]t is quite possible that our whole western civilization in its modern form, based
on ever increasing production and consumption, is a violation of natural order
which will bring about its collapse. It is possible that the unparalleled malignancy
of nationalism in our time is a sickness based on a pathologic industrialization, on
increasing unbalance between population and resource with increasing failure of
resource” (Martin 1987: xv).
Sauer provides further support for Fleure’s emphasis on diffusion and upon work.
However, I want to stress two further aspects of Sauer’s work that distance his eco-
logical reasoning from environmental determinism. The first is the idea that almost
all environments are already what Hegel termed “second nature.” In other words,
the environment is a historical product of cycles of past human occupancy and use.
The second, and related, lesson of his work is that the carrying capacity of a region
depends upon how it is exploited and it is quite possible that current landscapes are
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degraded when viewed from the perspective of carrying capacity. For example, in his
work on the transformation of the Caribbean under European colonialism, Sauer
(1966) used archaeological as well as Spanish literary evidence to describe a form of
farming that served local food needs rather than producing primary products for
export. Sauer followed early Spanish observers in describing Hispaniola (now the
Dominican Republic and Haiti) as a largely open landscape, cleared of its “natural”
trees and mainly cultivated by mixed cropping on mounds of earth. Combined with
fish and shellfish, this could support a very dense population. For the area under
Spanish control, Bartholomew Columbus counted 1.1 million from the returns of
the tax collectors he appointed in 1496. Sauer’s estimate of about 3 million 
Indians on the whole island in 1491 was ten times higher than that accepted by
Alfred Kroeber and Angel Rosenblat. This was the forerunner of a debate that 
soon produced similarly divergent population figures for many other parts of the
Caribbean as well as both North and South America (Denevan 1992). Within a
decade, the population of Hispaniola had been decimated and slaves were soon intro-
duced from Africa. Without Indian labor, the arable areas retreated in some places
before an expansion of pastoralism with its low intensity of labor and in others before
scrub and then woodland. By 1518 the population decline had been exacerbated by
the rounding up of Indians for slavery in the placer gold deposits and there their diet
was under ignorant Spanish control. The fate of the Indians was sealed: “[a] well-
structured and adjusted native society had become a formless proletariat in alien
servitude, its customary habits and enjoyments lost. The will to live and to repro-
duce was thus weakened” (Sauer 1966: 204). Disease completed what malnutrition
and despair had begun. By the 1530s there were hardly any Indians left. By the time
anthropologists arrived to examine the few groups who survived beyond the activ-
ity space of the Europeans, their earlier way of life was not even a memory and it
was all too easy to dismiss the earliest Spanish observers as romantics or even vain-
glorious conquerors exaggerating the military challenges they faced. By paying atten-
tion to the range of plants available and to the other food sources mentioned, Sauer
was able to give ecological credibility to these earliest accounts of something akin
to the “original affluent society” later described by Sahlins (1972).
Geographical Histories
Instead of building upon the ecological reasoning of such as Fleure and Sauer,
human geographers, in the main, turned away from historical studies towards con-
temporary studies of economic space. Sauer himself saw American geography taken
over by those he dismissed, in a letter of 1967, as “piddlers with forumulas of imag-
inary universals” (Martin 1987: xv). Nevertheless, the ecological perspective was
repeatedly taken up by economic historians, many of whom offered explanations
of Western development in which the environment played a key role. Environmen-
tal history was also taken up by scholars influenced by green politics and seeking
to chart and explain the environmental degradation they saw advancing across the
landscapes of both rich and poor countries. I want to show that the insights of
Fleure and Sauer remain relevant to these modern studies.
Jared Diamond’s (1997) explanation of why some peoples are rich and others
poor paints a broadly Darwinian picture in which inter-continental contact 
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produces conflicts which are ultimately settled by might backed up by technology
and disease immunity. The argument rests upon an account of how agriculture
develops in different environments. Eurasia had a great concentration of land in the
mid-latitudes most conducive to the growing of the most nutritionally efficient
grains. It also had a majority of the animals that have proved domesticable. Beyond
that, western Europe has a varied topography producing small states rather than
large empires and is thus prone to competition and innovation rather than to the
technological conservatism of the autocratic empires of Asia. The Eurasian part of
the argument is original to Diamond while the western European part derives from
the work of Eric Jones (1981). I think Jim Blaut (2000) was broadly right in his
criticisms of the antitropical bias in both Diamond and Jones. However, I think too
that Diamond has an important argument to make about the relationship between
populations and diseases. Many more people lived on the Eurasian than on the
American land mass. Given the simplicity of the linguistic map of Eurasia, its peoples
were probably in more intimate and frequent contact with each other than was the
case in America. It is certainly the case that a greater number of large animals had
been domesticated in Eurasia. Together these factors meant that the peoples of
Eurasia were subject to epidemics of contagious diseases, such as smallpox, which
had crossed over from animal reservoirs such as pigs, and which spread widely.
What Diamond offers, then, is a way of relating agricultural development to pat-
terns of disease and it is quite clear that the lack of any immunity to smallpox in
particular was an important part of the decimation of Amerindian peoples upon
contact. However, this cannot be the whole story, for at various points in its history
Europe was subject to truly devastating plagues from which it took scores of years
to recover. The crucial demographic feature in America is that virgin epidemics hap-
pened under the impress of colonialism and aboriginal populations got no oppor-
tunity to bounce back before their resources were simply taken away for use by
Europeans. It is the social disorganization and the appropriation of their land by
others that explains why Amerindian populations took so very long to achieve even
modest recovery after epidemic or war. I think Sauer understood this better than
does Diamond.
Jones’s arguments have been heavily criticized by Blaut (1993) for their ethno-
centrism. The environmental element of Jones’s account of the rise of Europe is cer-
tainly deterministic. Jones says that Europe is tectonically stable and is subject 
to none of the uncertainties of the monsoon climates of Asia. The topography of
Europe is varied, creating at the regional scale, a congeries of ecological niches with
products that complement one another, and at a larger scale a series of drainage
basins, separated by mountains, that cohere easily into states but are difficult to
combine into empires. Europe and not Asia has been capable of sustained, long-
term economic growth. Growth spurts in Asia are absorbed by population increases.
Jones’s argument is that the hostile climate and exploitative political system meant
that Asian peasants simply faced greater insecurity than did Europeans. As such,
they provided security in the form of children rather than running the risk of having
fixed capital assets destroyed in war or taxed away by rapacious emperors. Given
the different risk environments, Europeans and Asians made different but equally
rational choices, the first to put goods before children, and the latter to value off-
spring over material wealth. It should be clear that this is not, although Blaut wants
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to suggest that it is, an argument about European rationality versus Asian super-
stition. It is, however, an argument about how environments affect society and many
of Blaut’s criticisms of antitropical prejudice hold good here, as does his demon-
stration of the tremendous diversity within Asia. I want to draw attention to a 
different problem. Jones’s argument is not constructed on the basis of a properly
comparative study of Asian and European societies before 1492. If you look at the
evidence he relies upon, almost all the demographic material for places such as India
come from a period after European interference with those economies and societies.
To compare the famines in nineteenth-century India with the lack of extensive
famines in Europe since the seventeenth century is not to bear witness to the fail-
ures of climate but to the failings of colonial administration. As Sauer shows us, we
cannot read back postcontact social, demographic, and agricultural systems into
precontact times. Lack of evidence may drive us in that direction but the road to
historical error is paved with such good intentions.
Big-picture histories often operate with spatial units that are chaotic rather than
coherent (Lewis & Wigen 1997). They often make such units the bearers of a per-
sonality in ways that emphasize the radical separation between societies and their
deadly hostility towards each other. Culture replaces biology is the modern version
of Mackinder’s worldview and I feel that such as Samuel Huntington (1996) are
susceptible to the very criticisms Fleure made of the environmental determinists;
they pay too little attention to social organization and to the realities of economic
and cultural interaction across borders. The lessons of Sauer and Fleure are also
worth considering when looking at the second set of popular environmental histo-
ries that I want to consider. Some historians have taken up the concerns of the green
movement and tried to put them into a historical context by showing the unparal-
leled damage done to the environment by capitalism or industrialism, as they vari-
ously identify their enemy. Some of the most striking of these studies make up what
has been called the New Western History (Kearns 1997).
In many ways, Donald Worster (1993) makes very much the case against indus-
trialism that Sauer made. With industrialism, the homeostatic systems of Indian agri-
culture are displaced and aquifers are squandered, soils reduced to dust and nature
sacrificed to profits. In each case, I think their blanket dismissal of industrialism is
unfeasible but in Worster’s case I believe there is a further romantic denial of eco-
logical realities. Worster, unlike Sauer, sees Indians as ecological primitives, barely
marking the land. This, as Willems-Braun (1997) argued so well, is somewhat
patronizing and leaves Indians no place in the modern world. There are only ver-
sions of second nature available to us and purity cannot be an ecological virtue.
There are only ever valuations placed on their environments by people. We may
choose to celebrate color, or diversity, or biomass, or rare species, or unique eco-
logical niches. Environmental history can remind us how certain of these valuations
have come to be taken more seriously than others at various times. This, I think, is
the great strength of Bill Cronon’s (1991) work on Chicago and its hinterland. He
describes the nineteenth-century conversion of pigs, and cows, and trees, and grasses
into commodified pork, beef, pulp and grain. Production-line abattoirs change the
social conception of life. There is a brutality and lack of respect in the meat packing
plants and yet in the tins of corned beef a new vision of domestic life was also being
projected. Environmental history can return us to a sense of responsibility for the
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ecological realities upon which our labor-saving cooking and cheap food rests. Com-
modities reside in ecological as well as economic chains and their forward and back-
ward links equally bear consideration.
In engaging with the works of global economic historians and with “green” his-
tories, human geographers have found ways to pick up again themes from scholars
such as Fleure and Sauer, themes that had received but limited attention during the
so-called quantitative revolution. These themes were also raised by developments
within geography that explicitly confronted the ahistorical approaches swept into
geography with that revolution.
Marxism
Marxists were vital in linking geography to a broad range of social and economic
sciences. Marxism is inherently interdisciplinary. In some ways, it ignores academic
disciplines altogether. For geography, the radical attacks on quantification for its
political conservatism began a reengagement between geography and social theory
that still continues. The philosophical and the political were inextricably linked.
Marxism also aims at comprehensive explanation and thus a wide range of issues
can be taken up and mapped back onto its core arguments. There are clearly dangers
of reductionism in this but against that we have to recognize that before that point
is reached the basic materialism of the Marxist approach sensitizes geographical
inquiry to the exploration of a rich suite of interconnections, some of them envi-
ronmental, many of them historical. Environmental history was never dominant in
Marxist geography, which was focused in the main upon urban and economic geog-
raphy. However, there were two ways that Marxism did engage with environmen-
tal history. The first is in its basic philosophical anthropology and the second is in
its approach to natural hazards.
Neil Smith (1984), for example, engaged with the philosophical works of Alfred
Schmidt (1962) and Sebastiano Timpanaro (1970), among others, to provide a
reconsideration of the nature–society dialectic at the heart of geography. Smith
explained that instead of seeing nature as an external force constraining social
choices, we might consider how nature is transformed in the pursuit of social goals
but also how the transformation of nature both socialized and empowered humans.
Through work we make ourselves both human and social. Under capitalism,
however, nature is privatized and people commit themselves to work, in the main,
as to an external discipline necessary to get wages and thus to survive. Now, nature
does appear before many as an alien power. It is a mistake, however, not to realize
the historically contingent basis of this state of affairs. It is far from simply natural.
Smith argues that the term “natural” serves to hide the way societies, economies
and, yes, natures are the end points and not the starting points of production. There
is very little historical detail in this philosophical work (there is, for example, greater
historical detail in Harvey 1996) and there is even a dangerous tendency to treat
capitalism alone as truly productive of nature due to its great technological capac-
ity and to treat precapitalist societies as doing little more than scratching nature’s
surface. Smith (1984: 104) writes of “the natural economies of feudalism and other
precapitalist modes of production” and tells us that “capitalism inherits a territor-
ial division of labour rooted in natural differentiations.” Second nature, the product
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of fire and of forest-clearing, has been general in almost all areas of human occu-
pance for centuries before capitalism. The patchwork that Jones finds in Europe is
the product of such selective transformations. Indeed, the grain of ecological dif-
ferentiation has probably been made finer by human activity that it ever would be
without. In medieval England, for example, the complementarity of pastoral and
mixed-farming ecotones was established at the village level throughout lowland
regions and many upland regions too. As Sauer and Fleure might remind us, the
onset of capitalism is not the only historical transformation worthy of serious con-
sideration in the study of the relations between society and nature.
Natural hazards research had remained an area within geography where human
and physical approaches were at least neighbors as best exemplified in the work of
Gilbert White (1973, 1974; Burton et al. 1978). The historical dimension was some-
what weakly developed within this research tradition for it amounted to little more
than the investigation of the return-time of physical events of varying magnitudes.
Marxist thought inspired two significant revisions of this work. Both underline the
social nature of hazards. In the first place, geographers explored the significance of
the fact that people now relate to nature as a form of property. Property relations
structure access. These relations are historical products. They were different in the
past and will no doubt be different in the future.
The pioneering work in this area was Michael Watts’ (1983) study of food short-
ages in northern Nigeria. The famine of 1972–3 throughout much of sub-Saharan
Africa fixed images of starving Black babies as a synecdoche for Africa. This imagery
presented Africa as a place where nature was just too strong for a rather weak
culture and technology, the dilemma of underdevelopment (Jarosz 1992). Watts
(1983: xxiii) argued instead that “[a]ll climatic phenomena have social referents
which are historically specific forms of society.” When, during the nineteenth
century, the area was the Muslim Caliphate of Sokoto, the climate was just as vari-
able as under British colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century. In the
nineteenth century food shortages did not create mass starvation because the state
mitigated its tax demands in times of difficulty for farmers. There were also forms
of communal solidarity built into forms of labor tribute and gift reciprocity. In broad
terms, this precapitalist economy, well used to the threat of food shortage, aimed
at “the social provision of minimum income in the face of high risk” (Watts 1983:
89). In the first decade of the twentieth century, Britain took the area under colo-
nial rule. It decided that no individual property rights had previously existed and
thus it should nationalize all land and charge direct producers a tax for the annual
use of their plots. Now the goal of property management was to maintain a con-
stant tax-stream to sustain the colonial administration. This meant that producers
were under great stress in times of shortage. Petty commodity production broke up
collective solidarities. During the Second World War, for example, the consequences
of a drought were magnified for the farmers by the state’s demand for taxes and its
control of food prices so that inflation would not affect the production costs of the
tin produced for export. The result was that farmers fled to the towns or stayed put
and ate their seed corn. The property relations were overlain by a political system
that did not put rural living standards very high up its agenda. Food shortages are
always refracted through such political and institutional prisms. They are never truly
natural, and they never were.
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There have been many further studies on the political economy of environmen-
tal change including Piers Blaikie’s (1985) influential study of soil erosion and Judith
Carney’s (2001) study of technology transfer from Africa to Carolina in rice pro-
duction. I want, however, to draw attention to a second way Marxist writings influ-
enced the revision of the natural hazards tradition in geography. Property relations
certainly affect how “natural” resources are transformed by work. They are also
part of the power relations shaping how disasters reverberate through society. The
Sahel drought of 1972–3 created widespread suffering, the English drought of 1976
prevented people legally watering their lawns for a while. There is no correlation
between the scale of an environmental perturbation and the human consequences
that follow upon it. Some people are more at risk than others and some people have
a better chance of recovering their livelihoods than do others. Location, poverty,
communal resources and insurance all go to form a social distribution of vulnera-
bility that directs disasters towards their victims. This framework has been devel-
oped in a fantastic book, At Risk (Blaikie et al. 1994), and it has been applied to
AIDS in Uganda (Barnett & Blaikie 1992). Barnett and Blaikie show that the
upstream causes of vulnerability to HIV infection and the downstream impact of
AIDS sickness and mortality follows social faultlines that can best be understood in
terms of the political and economic history of Uganda. The transformation of the
economy under the vicious rule of Idi Amin imposed price controls that simultane-
ously weakened the rural sector and placed a high premium upon the smuggling 
of products such as coffee out of the country. This had gendered consequences with
men leaving villages to follow the contraband flows and women left behind with
little access to markets in their own right. Under these circumstances, sex work at
the truck stops along the smuggling routes became an all too understandable and
dangerous survival strategy for many women. The transformation of the rural
society under the impress of AIDS mortality also placed under great stress the coping
mechanisms by which villagers had characteristically dealt with the occasional
tragedy of the death of parents. Barnett and Blaikie show how under a new regime
of labour, patterns of farming are transformed undermining the prospects of capital
investment or food security. The perspectives of At Risk could usefully be applied
to a wide range of hazards to produce a new kind of environmental history in geog-
raphy (Kearns 2000).
The Cultural Turn
Marxism, then, has directed geographers’ attention to the historical contingencies
of property relations, which form the terms on which society achieves its material
grounding. The historical relativity of this dialectic between nature and society had
been occluded in much of the process-based studies that dominated geography in
the 1960s and 1970s. The historical naivety of the way terms like nature were used
in geography did not render them innocent of unexamined political and philo-
sophical content. The normative content of the term “natural” has rarely been as
carefully examined as it was in Clarence Glacken’s (1967) great survey of the notion
that nature might have a design benevolent to human purposes. Perhaps because
his survey ended in the eighteenth century, it did not have the impact on contem-
porary geographical studies that it deserved to have. It was treated as a work on
202 GERRY KEARNS
the history rather than the practice of geography yet its exploration of some of 
the central and contestable terms of the discipline anticipate much of what has 
since been taken up under the impress of the so-called “cultural turn.” The cultural
turn in the social sciences is a turn towards the explication of meaning as a sort 
of hermeneutics of suspicion. Social scientists have been directed towards a con-
sideration of the untenable assumptions that hide behind the “big concepts” they
use. Central to this interrogation has been a recognition that a model of the evo-
lution of an “enlightened” West has been taken as normative in their theories. 
In asserting a single rationality, social scientists have more or less unwittingly 
elevated the world view of the heroic, bourgeois, white male to a position of 
unquestioned universality. Under the pressure of anticolonial, feminist, lesbian and 
gay criticisms, this universality has been revealed as partiality; its privileges repro-
duced where they are unexamined. Within geography these arguments have 
produced a new sort of environmental history, a history of the construction of 
environmental meanings. I want to examine two moments in this new history, the
first contextualizes environmental knowings and the second questions their hidden
violence.
The works of Raymond Williams (1973) and John Barrell (1980) have served as
paradigms for geographical studies of the development of environmental ideas.
Williams showed how a romantic view of a bucolic rural past served in nineteenth-
century Britain as a way to point out the evils of unnatural industry. He also showed
that the designing of some rural landscapes to replicate this imagined, Edenic vision
was a way to hide the realities of production and exploitation upon which rural
wealth was built. Landscapes screened work. Barrell showed that similar strategies
lay behind contemporary landscape painting but that the pain of the derangement
of village society under the modernizing and effacing drive of enclosure could yet
be recovered from the works of such poets as John Clare. Art historians such as
Timothy Clark (1985) and planning historians such as Donald Olsen (1986) took
these arguments to town. We can see these approaches to landscape very clearly in
the collection of geographical essays edited by Denis Cosgrove and Steve Daniels
(1988). This is a thoroughly interdisciplinary field but I want to silence briefly that
conversation and highlight a few of the contributions by geographers.
Daniels (1993), for example, has described the ways that representations of land-
scapes attempt to define the nation as a community with a certain set of values.
Certain national realities were always evoked by English woodlands, which might,
for example, be under royal ownership or earmarked for naval ships. Across the
water in France, trees might recall quite different values, might recall indeed the
trees of liberty planted throughout France after the Revolution. Cosgrove (1993)
describes the way that the landscapes of Venice were redesigned in the sixteenth
century so that they might serve as a setting for the inculcation of certain values in
an attempt to consolidate and render natural a new political reality based on landed
rather than purely maritime wealth. John Andrews (1975) has given an account of
how the English effectively estranged the Irish from their own past by remapping
and renaming the Irish landscape in the nineteenth century, replacing Irish names
with English ones. In studies such as these, either landscapes are viewed as repre-
sentations and their, often implicit, meanings decoded, or representations of land-
scapes are taken as expressive of certain sets of power relations.
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Let me turn, now, to the second cultural strand that I want to draw out. I am
concerned here with a more radical set of questionings. These scholars are not con-
cerned to read landscapes or their representations as expressing social relations so
much as questioning the positions from which landscapes were and are read. Instead
of seeing the map as expressing a certain ideology, we might see it as suppressing
other ideologies in the act of claiming any single authoritative viewpoint. By con-
sidering the direct othering of standpoints, we can explore the implicit constitution
of an authoritative self who would feel comfortable looking in this way from this
position. The topographical metaphor of surveying captures much of what is at
stake here for it implies a single locus from which all meaning may be adequately
gathered. But how might things appear to the sideways look? Brian Harley, for
example, looked at maps as efforts to censor subaltern views of the world (Laxton
2001). Drawing upon Edward Said’s (1978) use of the works of Michel Foucault,
Harley went in search of the margins of maps. He tried to ask what interests were
served by the silences imposed by the authoritative map.
Gillian Rose (1993) explicated the gendered dimensions of geographical knowl-
edge in her wide-ranging Feminism and Geography. Environmental history is not
only the story of the dispossession and separation of certain classes from the land
through the assertion of property, it is also about the reproduction of patriarchy
through gendered access to resources and the representation of gender through his-
torically specific constructions of “nature.” The two are related, of course. The allo-
cation to women of tasks such as child rearing and the attendant devaluation of
this work, sits alongside the exclusion of women from a full public life be that
expressed in the market or the forum. Rose shows how these polarities run through
geography with its devaluation of subjectivity in favor of a spurious objectivity, with
the heroic explorer now seen in the hardy field scientist of physical geography, and
the domestic entertainments of the butterfly collector now seen in the soft studies
of the cultural geographer (Kearns 1997).
Rose also considers the pleasures of landscape and notes that the satisfaction of
the imperial gaze depended firstly upon ownership but reminds us that this owner-
ship was almost always male and, certainly in the nineteenth-century examples 
discussed by the cultural geographers above, extended from land to wife. If we
examine, for example, the use of the pastoral aesthetic to embellish upper-middle-
class suburbs in the cities of late nineteenth-century North America, we find a whole
series of mappings of bodies onto places that inscribe contemporary patriarchy onto
the land. Urban environments are expressive of gender and not only class. The 
curvaceous, lightly rolling aesthetic of places such as Riversdale (Chicago) was in
marked contrast to the rectilinear landscape of the downtown Loop (Bluestone
1991). The soft lines of the suburb evoked “nature,” in the comfort of whose bosom
the male might recline at the end of a day in the public grip of Mammon. It was
the place for families, for the safe reproduction of a social class. It was a domestic
space. It was a place for women. Why, women might even walk about in public in
the suburbs without inviting scandal. The aesthetic not only equated women with
nature, but it also placed women. It placed them away from the public sphere. It
left them where “their” men had put them while the men were free to disport them-
selves at will both home and away. These gendered activity spaces are clearly artic-
ulated in contemporary novels where women act through the disembodied emissary
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of the letter, whereas the men stroll around as they wish. The contrast between
mobile Leopold and static Molly Bloom in James Joyce’s Ulysses illustrates this 
perfectly.
A critical and effective environmental history might take up these concerns of the
cultural geographers and explore how the making of environments, be they urban
or rural, is always also the making of certain sorts of people through both express-
ing ideologies and by inviting us to read certain bodies in certain ways depending
upon where we come across them (as in discourses of the “public” woman). This
will mean imposing upon representations all the things they forget, the exclusions
they find natural.
Conclusion
I have suggested that in various ways environmental history was devalued in geog-
raphy after the demise of environmental determinism. I have also suggested that
geographers in large part also turned their back upon the important lessons that
contemporary critics of environmental determinism had developed in their own
work. I have argued that environmental history has come to be of renewed impor-
tance in modern geography for three reasons. First, this form of geographical and
ecological reasoning has proved of great interest to both global economic histori-
ans and to historians influenced by green politics. I have suggested that in each case,
the lessons of earlier geographers might still have much to contribute to the devel-
opment of these studies in environmental history. In the second place, interest in
environmental history has been renewed in geography through human geographers’
critical engagement with Marxist thought. I have proposed that paying attention to
the property relations structuring the mutual constitution of societies and natures,
and to the social distribution of vulnerability in the face of environmental risk create
an agenda for a fruitful integration of geography and environmental history. Finally,
I described some of the ways that geographers have engaged with certain of the
issues raised by the so-called cultural turn in the social sciences and humanities. I
have looked at landscapes as attempts to express and reinforce certain sets of power
relations. I have also looked at them as attempts to silence various other readings
and other voices.
I want to conclude by suggesting that these two ways of reinvigorating environ-
mental history within human geography are inadequate without each other. This 
is argued quite magnificently in Don Mitchell’s (1996) The Lie of the Land. Mitchell
argues that landscape meanings relate to landscape use. He recalls Williams’s (1973)
argument about landscape as an aesthetic effacing the work upon which it is raised.
To the victors, go the imperial gaze. They not only write the history, they also frame
the vista that presents one contingent result as natural. The dominant view of 
California as a land of plenty, inhabited by sturdy yeomen, is one such vista.
Mitchell describes the bloody battles that were won before the victors could survey
the scene with such equanimity. By excavating the strikers, the Mexicans, the
women- and child-laborers, and the communists who are buried beneath that defeat,
he calls to our minds how it might have been, should have been, different. These
alternative histories should also be part of our geographies. The relationship
between aesthetics and property is often this violent.
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This has more in common with Sauer on the dynamics of the Columbian
encounter than Mitchell allows in his discussion of Sauer’s organicism. It also
returns us to the global economic histories I discussed above. If geography is in part
about the study of how spatial differentiation is produced and reproduced, then,
the violence of property relations must be brought within the remit of economic
geography. Watts makes this clear. So, too, in a remarkable book, does Mike Davis
(2001). Late Victorian Holocausts is precisely the sort of integration of environ-
mental and historical-geographical perspectives that I am asking for. Like Sauer,
Davis explores how landscapes become degraded under colonial rule. Here,
however, we are dealing with the types of food shortages under the impress of com-
modification that Watts describes. Davis’s argument pays attention to the murder-
ous violence of the malignant neglect visited upon colonial subjects by their British
rulers. Famines were exploited as opportunities to teach native people the discipline
of the Malthusian realities they appeared to ignore. These realities were in fact
shaped by the sort of property and tax regime that Watts describes for early 
twentieth-century Northern Nigeria. Davis proposes that the environmental per-
turbation of the failure of the rains was directed to do the work of breaking the
subsistence economies of India, Brazil, and China so that all their production might
pass through the market. So little came back from the market to the producers that
they starved in their millions and were left helpless and desperate fodder for future
rounds of capitalist exploitation, a docile because impoverished proletariat. This,
he suggests, is the origin of the Third World. This work places environmental history
at the heart of global economic history but it does so with a full recognition of the
importance of the changing, and tragic, social organization of production.
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